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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Timothy Robert Duane Wilkins appeals from the judgment of conviction,
convicting him of possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug
paraphernalia, following a jury trial.

Mr. Wilkins asserts that the evidence was

insufficient to support his convictions for possession of a controlled substance and drug
paraphernalia, and that the evidence was insufficient to support the district court's
finding that he was a persistent violator. He further asserts that the district court abused
its discretion when it imposed an excessive sentence on the possession of a controlled
substance charge. 1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
This case began when Mr. Wilkins was stopped by Corporal Lind, of the Idaho
State Police, following a complaint about his driving.

(Tr., p.41, L.13- p.45, L.21.)

Mr. Wilkins was arrested for driving without privileges. (Tr., p.47, Ls.2-7.) After placing
Mr. Wilkins in handcuffs in the back of his patrol car, Corporal Lind, assisted by Trooper
Spike, inventoried the truck that Mr. Wilkins had been driving. (Tr., p.47, L.10 - p.48,
L.14.) During that inventory, Trooper Spike alerted Corporal Lind to the presence of
some plastic baggies, a lighter, and what "looked like a glass pipe" in a compartment
located on the dashboard.2

(Tr., p.49, L.24 - p.50, L.20.)

Corporal Lind took a

photograph of the items as they were positioned before pulling a plastic bag out and

1

Mr. Wilkins has already served the full sentence for the misdemeanor charge of
possession of drug paraphernalia, therefore rendering any excessive sentence claim as
to that charge moot.
2
Corporal Lind testified that it was only after picking up the baggies that he was able to
recognize that they contained suspected methamphetamine. (Tr., p.56, Ls.6-19.)
1

taking additional photographs. (Tr., p.51, L.1 - p.52, L.16.) When Mr. Wilkins was told
of the discovery of the items in the truck, he became "excited[,]" "[s]aid it wasn't his[,]"
and "[e)ventually ... accused me of planting it." (Tr., p.55, L.3 - p.56, L.2.)
As a result of this incident, Mr. Wilkins was charged by Information with
possession of a controlled substance, driving while suspended, possession of drug
paraphernalia, and failure to provide proof of liability insurance. 3 (R., pp.36-37.) Part II
of the Information charged him with a persistent violator enhancement.

(R., p.38.)

Following jury selection, the district court issued orders precluding the State from
mentioning in its "case in chief the citizen's observations of the driving, nor the report
that the citizen made to the trooper" (Tr., p.20, Ls.12-14), and "from putting on any
evidence that this vehicle was stolen."4 (Tr., p.26, Ls.20-21.)
In the State's case-in-chief, Corporal Lind and Trooper Spike testified about the
details surrounding their discovery of the baggies and pipe in the dashboard
compartment during their inventory of the truck that Mr. Wilkins was driving. (Tr., p.49,
L.24 - p.56, L.19, p.106, L.18 - p.110, L.21.) A DVD recording of the encounter from
the dashboard video system in Corporal Lind's patrol car was admitted as Plaintiff's
Exhibit No. 7, and played for the jury. 5 (Tr., p.59, L.13 - p.62, L.13, p.64, Ls.16-24.)
David Sincerbeaux, an employee of the Idaho State Police Forensic Laboratory,
testified that he tested the substance contained in one of the baggies, using both a

3

Prior to trial, Mr. Wilkins filed "a written guilty plea" to the charges of driving without
privileges and failure to provide proof of liability insurance. (Tr., p.27, L.18 - p.28, L.6;
R., pp.165-68.)
4
Mr. Wilkins was charged separately with stealing the vehicle in which he was stopped,
a charge that the State unsuccessfully sought to consolidate with this case. (R., pp.5257.)
5
In order to avoid the jury hearing that the truck was reported stolen, the parties
stipulated that the DVD was to "be stopped at a spot that I think counsel characterized
in the counter system as 2330." (Tr., p.62, Ls.7-10.)
2

screening color test and a gas chromatograph mass spectrometer, and concluded that it
contained methamphetamine. (Tr., p.120, L.2 - p.125, L.1.) Finally, the State called
Alex Smith, an employee of the company from whose lot the truck driven by Mr. Wilkins
was purportedly stolen, who testified that the truck was missing from the lot for
approximately six days in February. 6 (Tr., p.130, L.15 - p.133, L.4.)
In his defense, Mr. Wilkins called one witness: Noah Peterson.

(Tr., p.141,

Ls.10-11.) Mr. Peterson testified that the night before Mr. Wilkins was arrested he and
Mr. Wilkins were in the truck together. (Tr., p.141, L.24 - p.142, L.15.) Mr. Peterson
testified that after picking him up, Mr. Wilkins drove to his apartment to get "cleaned up"
before they went out to meet up with some "girls." (Tr., p.142, Ls.17-20.) Mr. Peterson
waited in the truck while Mr. Wilkins was cleaning up in his apartment, and, while alone,
smoked some methamphetamine. (Tr., p.144, Ls.4-23.) Before Mr. Wilkins returned to
the truck, Mr. Peterson placed his baggies of methamphetamine, pipe, and lighter into
the dashboard compartment. (Tr., p.145, Ls.13-25, p.150, Ls.2 - p.151, L.11.) After
learning that Mr. Wilkins had been arrested for the items that he placed in the truck,
Mr. Peterson wrote a letter to Mr. Wilkins' defense attorney explaining that the drugs
and paraphernalia were his. (Tr., p.168, Ls.3-24.) The letter was admitted at trial as
Defendant's Exhibit A. (Tr., p.172, L.3 - p.173, L.24.)
Following deliberations, Mr. Wilkins was found guilty of the two counts submitted
to the jury: possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia.
(Tr., p.186, Ls.2-4.) The parties waived a jury trial with respect to the persistent violator

6

Consistent with the district court's ruling prohibiting any mention of the purported theft
of the truck, the witness was limited to testifying that he noticed that the truck was
missing on February 15, 2010, and that it was returned to the lot on February 21, 2010.
(Tr., p.132, Ls.3-19.) The incident in this case is alleged to have occurred on
February 20, 2010.
3

enhancement. (Tr., p.184, L.1 - p.185, L.8.) The State offered, and the district court
admitted, two prior judgments of conviction as Plaintiff's Exhibits Nos. 9 and 10.
(Tr., p.190, L.12 - p.191, L.12.) In closing, defense counsel argued that the State had
failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Wilkins was the person named in the
exhibits. (Tr., p.192, L.23 - p.193, L.16.) During closing argument, defense counsel
noted that the trial court was the same judge as had signed both judgments, and
argued, "I don't think the Court can consider things that you have heard before in other
proceedings as evidence in this matter." (Tr., p.192, Ls.18-22.)
In reaching its finding that Mr. Wilkins was a persistent violator, the district court
explained,
And the Court, also I have to say, has an independent memory of
Mr. Wilkins as having been before the Court before. Without looking at
these judgments, I could not have said what he has been convicted of,
whether it was a felony or a misdemeanor, without reviewing the
documents. But I do recognize Mr. Wilkins. And when I look at these
particular judgments I do recognize Timothy Robert Duane Wilkins of
these judgments to be the Mr. Wilkins that is the Defendant in this
particular case.
(Tr., p.195, L.25 - p.196, L.9 (emphases added).)
At the sentencing hearing, the State requested "five years fixed plus five years
for a total of ten years on the habitual, five years plus two years for a total of seven
years on the possession."

(Tr., p.284, Ls.12-15.)

Defense counsel requested

probation, leaving the length of any underlying sentence to the district court's discretion.
(Tr., p.286, L.25 - p.287, L.6.) Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified sentence
of ten years, with five years fixed, and declined to grant probation or retain jurisdiction. 7

7

Mr. Wilkins received jail sentences for the paraphernalia and driving without privileges
charges and a fine for failure to carry proof of financial responsibility. (Tr., p.293, L.23 p.294, L.5.) Mr. Wilkins does not appeal the misdemeanor sentences, as they have
already been served, and any excessive sentence claims are therefore moot.
4

(Tr., p.293, Ls.7-11.) Mr. Wilkins filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the judgment of
conviction. (Appended to Motion to Augment filed on June 24, 2011.)

5

ISSUES

1.

Was the evidence sufficient to support Mr. Wilkins' conviction for possession of a
controlled substance, possession of drug paraphernalia, and the finding that he
was a persistent violator?

2.

Did the district court err when it relied on its own memory to find Mr. Wilkins to be
a persistent violator?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an excessive sentence
following Mr. Wilkins' conviction for possession of a controlled substance as a
persistent violator?

6

ARGUMENT

I.
The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support Mr. Wilkins' Conviction For Possession Of A
Controlled Substance, Possession Of Paraphernalia, And The Finding That He Was A
Persistent Violator
A.

Introduction
The State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that Mr. Wilkins possessed a controlled substance, possessed paraphernalia,
and that he was a persistent violator. With respect to the possession charges, the State
presented insufficient evidence to establish that Mr. Wilkins knowingly possessed the
methamphetamine or the pipe. As for the persistent violator enhancement, without the
district court's reliance on its own memory of having dealt with Mr. Wilkins in prior
criminal proceedings, the evidence was insufficient to support its finding.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review for an appellate court regarding the sufficiency of the

evidence to sustain a conviction is set forth in State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809, 823
(Ct. App. 1992), in which the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that:
A conviction will not be set aside where there is substantial evidence upon
which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. On appeal, we construe all facts,
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, in favor of upholding the
jury's verdict. Where there is competent although conflicting evidence to
sustain the verdict, we will not reweigh the evidence or disturb the verdict.
Id. (citations omitted).

"For evidence to be substantial, it must be of sufficient quality

that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion." State v. Johnson, 131 Idaho
808, 809 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing Bott v. Idaho State Bldg. Auth., 128 Idaho 580, 586
(1996)).
7

C.

The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support A Conviction For Possession Of A
Controlled Substance Or Possession Of Paraphernalia
Considering

the

lack

of

evidence

connecting

Mr.

Wilkins

to

the

methamphetamine and pipe found in the truck, along with the exculpating testimony of
defense witness Noah Peterson, there was not substantial evidence that Mr. Wilkins
was in possession of methamphetamine or paraphernalia, and, as such, the jury's
verdicts must be vacated and judgments of acquittal entered as to those charges.
At trial, the State presented evidence that less than three-tenths of a gram 8 of
methamphetamine and a pipe were found in a truck that Mr. Wilkins was driving.
(Tr., p.124, L.24 - p.125, L.10.) The methamphetamine was in a plastic baggie that
was in a compartment in the truck's dashboard along with a pipe. 9 (Tr., p.50, Ls.4-6.)
Corporal Lind testified that he began to inventory the truck from the driver's side, but did
not notice any contraband until Trooper Spike, who was assisting with the inventory
from the passenger side, alerted him to a pipe and some baggies in the dashboard
compartment. (Tr., p.48, L.15 - p.50, L.20.)
While Corporal Lind "immediately recognized the pipe[,]" he did not recognize the
baggie as containing suspected methamphetamine until after "I picked it up and looked
at it." (Tr., p.56, Ls.6-19.) Corporal Lind acknowledged that the first photograph, which

8

Only one of the two baggies containing suspected methamphetamine - "[t]he one with
the most" - was weighed and tested. The weight of the substance in that baggie was
0.29 gram. (Tr., p.125, Ls.4-10.)
9
Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 1 through 4 are photographs taken of the dashboard and the
items, which appear to be two small plastic baggies, one of which is almost empty and
the other of which contains a small amount of a crystal-like substance, a plastic lighter,
and a glass pipe. (Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 1 through 4.) However, only the first
photograph, one of two contained in Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, represents the position of
the items at the time they were discovered. (Tr., p.51, L.19 - p.52, L.16 (Describing just
one photograph as being of the items before they were moved, with Corporal Lind
asked to place a checkmark next to any photograph depicting the items before they
were moved).)
8

he took while standing on the driver's side of the vehicle, in Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1
reflected all that he could see when he took it, which was only a lighter. (Tr., p.67, L.8 p.68, L.14.) When he was informed of the discovery of methamphetamine and a pipe in
the truck, Mr. Wilkins became "excited[,]" said that "it wasn't his[,]" and "accused me
[Corporal Lind] of planting it" (Tr., p.55, L.21 - p.56, L.2.) Mr. Wilkins never admitted
to knowing about the methamphetamine or the pipe. (Tr., p.73, Ls.4-22.) The items
were never tested for fingerprints or DNA. (Tr., p.71, L.23-p.72, L.2.)
The defense called a single witness: Noah Peterson. Mr. Peterson testified that,
when he found out that Mr. Wilkins had been charged with possession of
methamphetamine and paraphernalia for the items discovered in the truck, he wrote a
letter to defense counsel admitting that he had placed the items in the truck without
Mr. Wilkins' knowledge. (Tr., p.168, Ls.3-24; Defendant's Exhibit No. [sic] A.)
Mr. Peterson explained that, the night before Mr. Wilkins' arrest, Mr. Wilkins
picked him up in the truck, and they went to Albertson's before stopping at Mr. Wilkins'
apartment.

Mr. Peterson remained in the truck while Mr. Wilkins went into his

apartment to get "cleaned up" before going "to see some girls[.]" Mr. Wilkins was gone
for approximately forty-five minutes during which time Mr. Peterson used a glass pipe to
smoke methamphetamine before putting the methamphetamine, pipe, and lighter into
the dashboard compartment. When he left the truck later that evening, he "spaced the
pipe and the drugs in the dash ... [and] left them there." Mr. Peterson did not want
Mr. Wilkins to know about the drugs because he "knew he didn't smoke. And I didn't
want to tempt him or be around him with the substance." (Tr., p.141, L.19 - p.164,
L.25.)

9

A number of Idaho cases have addressed what constitutes constructive
possession of drugs or other contraband. In order to be found guilty on a constructive
possession theory, the State must prove that the defendant had both knowledge of and
control over the contraband. See State v. Garza, 112 Idaho 776, 778 (Ct. App. 1987),
("Where, as here, the question is one of constructive possession, the state must prove
that the defendant had both knowledge and control of the drugs."); State v. Vinton, 11 O
Idaho 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that, although the State "established the
existence of cultivated marijuana and the status of the Vintons as joint owners of the
property ... [t]hat, in our view does not constitute substantial evidence to uphold the
conviction of either defendant individually.").
One constructive possession case is almost directly on point with the facts of
Mr. Wilkins' case.

In State v. Burnside, 115 Idaho 882 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court of

Appeals had to determine, inter a/ia, whether there was substantial evidence to support
the jury's guilty verdict on a charge of possession of psilocybin mushrooms with the
intent to deliver. Id. at 885. The case began when the police, armed with a warrant to
search Burnside's car for evidence of methamphetamine dealing, approached him and
a passenger while they were eating in a restaurant. 10 During the search of the car, the
police discovered both methamphetamine and psilocybin mushrooms.

Burnside was

charged with, and convicted of, possession of psilocybin mushrooms with intent to
deliver and possession of methamphetamine. 11 Id. at 883.

10

Nothing in the opinion indicates that the police had ever observed the person eating
with Burnside as a passenger in the vehicle.
11
Burnside did not appeal the possession of methamphetamine conviction on
sufficiency grounds. Burnside, 115 Idaho at 883.

10

The Court of Appeals noted that, in order to prove that Burnside possessed the
psilocybin mushrooms, the State had to establish that he was "aware the mushrooms
were in his car and that he exercised dominion or control over them." Id. at 885. It
noted that "the jury could not infer constructive possession from the mere fact that
Burnside occupied, with a passenger, the automobile in which the drugs were seized."
Id. (citing State v. Warden, 97 Idaho 752 (1976)). The Court of Appeals explained that,

"in order to prevail, the state had to offer evidence which established that Burnside,
individually, knew of the illegal drugs and that he exercised dominion over them."
Burnside, 115 Idaho at 885.

In concluding that the State had not met its burden, the Court of Appeals
analyzed the relevant facts:
The mushrooms were discovered in a black vinyl bag in Burnside's
automobile. When the police began their search of the car, Burnside told
the officers that the bag was not his. At trial, Burnside's passenger, Redd,
repeatedly declared that he, and not Burnside, owned the mushrooms.
Evidence suggested that Burnside may have sold the mushrooms to
Redd, several hours earlier, in a motel room. The mushrooms later were
packaged for delivery. However, Redd claimed at trial, that he, and not
Burnside, had packaged the mushrooms.
When asked if he had
packaged the mushrooms for Burnside, Redd stated that he could not
remember.
The evidence does not establish that Burnside exercised dominion and
control over the mushrooms, when in the car. The state failed to rebut
Redd's claim of sole ownership ... Burnside's remark to the police, that
the black bag was not his, suggests he probably knew the drugs were in
his car. The motel sale also indicates Burnside's knowledge. However,
neither piece of evidence establishes control. We find an absence of
evidence on this element of the offense.
Id. at 885-86.

In Mr. Wilkins' case, as in Burnside, there was a denial of ownership of drugs
found in a vehicle driven by the defendant, and sworn testimony from a passenger that
the drugs belonged to the passenger. Here, as in Burnside, the State failed to rebut the
11

passenger's claim of ownership of the contraband. The only difference between the two
cases is that in Burnside there was evidence that Burnside knew of the presence of the
drugs in his car, while in this case no evidence exists that Mr. Wilkins knew that the
drugs or paraphernalia in the truck. Additionally, here, unlike in Burnside, there is no
evidence that Mr. Wilkins owned the vehicle in which the drugs were found.
To allow the jury's verdict to stand in light of the total lack of evidence that
Mr. Wilkins had both knowledge of and control over the methamphetamine and the
paraphernalia 12 would be to allow a conviction to stand not on substantial evidence but
on speculation. Mr. Wilkins respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgments
of conviction and remand this matter for the entry of judgments of acquittal on the
charges of possession of a controlled substance and possession of paraphernalia.

D.

The Evidence Was Insufficient To Support A Persistent Violator Finding
Under Idaho's persistent violator law, a person convicted of a felony for the third

time faces a minimum sentence of five years, with a maximum possible sentence of life
imprisonment.

I.C. § 19-2514.

The State must plead the persistent violator

enhancement in the indictment or information, and must prove the identity of the
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Ct. App. 2003).

State v. Cheatham, 139 Idaho 413, 416

When the State produces nothing more than a certified copy of a

judgment of conviction containing the same name as the defendant, the evidence is
insufficient to support a persistent violator finding.

12

State v. Martinez, 102 Idaho 875,

Mr. Wilkins acknowledges that the paraphernalia conviction represents a closer case,
as Corporal Lind testified that, although he couldn't see that there was anything, let
alone methamphetamine, in the baggies until he picked them up and looked at them,
that he could tell that he "immediately recognized the pipe" as a meth pipe. (Tr., p.56,
Ls.6-19.)
12

880 (Ct. App. 1982). A judgment of conviction, when accompanied by mug shots and a
fingerprint card, is sufficient to support such a finding. Id.
A verdict must be based on the evidence presented in court. State v. Thomas,
94 Idaho 430, 433 (1971) ("[T)he most important of the constitutional requirements in
the area of protections against pre-trial publicity is that the 'jury's verdict be based on
evidence received in open court, not from outside sources."' (quoting Sheppard v.

Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966)).

In Patterson v. State of Colorado ex rel. Attorney

General, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), in upholding a finding of contempt against a newspaper
for publishing material that "reflected upon the motives and conduct of the supreme
court of Colorado in cases still pending," the Supreme Court explained,
The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a case
will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not by
any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.
Id. at 462.
In his closing argument regarding the persistent violator enhancement, defense
counsel argued that the State had failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Wilkins was the person named in the judgments of conviction. (Tr., p.192, L.23 p.193, L.16.)

In announcing its finding that Mr. Wilkins was a persistent violator, the

district court explained,

And the Court, also I have to say, has an independent memory of
Mr. Wilkins as having been before the Court before. Without looking at
these judgments, I could not have said what he has been convicted of,
whether it was a felony or a misdemeanor, without reviewing the
documents. But / do recognize Mr. Wilkins. And when I look at these
particular judgments I do recognize Timothy Robert Duane Wilkins of
these judgments to be the Mr. Wilkins that is the Defendant in this
particular case.
(Tr., p.195, L.25 - p.196, L.9 (emphases added).)

13

This was a violation of Mr. Wilkins' right to have his case decided on the
evidence introduced in open court, and without the district court's reliance on its own
memory, the evidence was insufficient to support a persistent violator finding.
Mr. Wilkins respectfully requests that this Court vacate the persistent violator finding,
and remand this matter for resentencing on the possession of a controlled substance
charge without a persistent violator enhancement. 13

11.
The District Court Was A Witness, And Its Memories Of Matters Outside Of The
Record Should Not Have Been Used To Support Its Findings
The district court acted as a witness in this case when it relied on its own
memories of prior dealings with Mr. Wilkins in concluding that he was the person named
in the judgments and finding him to be a persistent violator.

The persistent violator

finding must be reversed because it was made by a judge who acted as a witness.
Idaho Rule of Evidence 605 provides, "The judge presiding at the trial may not
testify in that trial as a witness.

No objection need be made in order to preserve the

point." Id.
Although the district court did not testify in the traditional sense at trial on the
persistent violator enhancement, it engaged in the functional equivalent of testifying
when it explained that it was relying on its own memory in order to find that the State
had met its burden of establishing Mr. Wilkins' identity beyond a reasonable doubt.
Doing so was improper, and should result in the reversal of the district court's finding
that Mr. Wilkins was a persistent violator.

13

Obviously, if Mr. Wilkins' claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence for the
underlying felony charge is successful, this claim will be moot.

14

Because it acted in violation of Idaho Rule of Evidence 605, Mr. Wilkins
respectfully requests that this Court vacate the persistent violator finding, and remand
this matter for a new trial on the persistent violator enhancement before a judge who is
not a witness to the underlying allegations. 14

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Excessive Sentence
Following Mr. Wilkins' Conviction For Possession Of A Controlled Substance With A
Persistent Violator Enhancement
Mr. Wilkins asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten
years, with five years fixed, for possession of a controlled substance is excessive.
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh
sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence."'

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Wilkins does not allege that
his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse

of discretion, Mr. Wilkins must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
was excessive considering any view of the facts.

Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120

Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385
(1992)). The governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection
of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
14

See note 13.
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rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v.

Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)).
The Idaho appellate courts have held that a defendant's troubled childhood,
including one in which abuse was present, is a mitigating factor to be considered at
sentencing. See State v. Walker, 129 Idaho 409, 410 (Ct. App. 1996) (district court did
not abuse its discretion in imposing fixed sentence of twenty-nine years for first degree
murder because it considered, inter alia, that defendant "had been sexually assaulted
as a child"); see also State v. Windsor, 110 Idaho 410, 423 (1985) (one factor
supporting Idaho Supreme Court's holding that the death penalty was excessive was
the defendant's "extremely troubled" childhood with "serious problems in the home
environment").
Mr. Wilkins' childhood was nightmarish.

During his Presentence lnestigation

Report (hereinafter, PSI), Mr. Wilkins provided the following description of his childhood:
Crappy childhood, extremely poor, kicked out of home age 10. sent to
foster homes, physically & sexually abused. sent to youth ranch sexually
abused there. Sent to Nevada to live with father. Introduced to drugs, city
life. moved back to Idaho when 16. 17 was sent to y.s.c. for 9 months.
Been on my own, struggling to get it right ever since.
PSI, p.14 (typographical errors in original).)
In an earlier PSI, Mr. Wilkins elaborated on his childhood introduction to drugs,
explaining that "he visited his father when he was seven years old and his father gave
him marijuana." (PSI, p.13.) Mr. Wilkins' brother described the childhood sexual abuse
of Mr. Wilkins as follows:
While living in Reno, Timothy was molested multiple times by a neighbor.
Timothy was one of eight children she affected, Timothy was interviewed
by Reno PD, statements were given, and she was arrested, found guilty
and sentenced to ten years.
(Jacob A. Smithson Letter, dated June 14, 2010 (hereinafter, Smithson Letter), p.(2].)
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The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that an important factor in fashioning a
sentence is whether an offender enjoys the support of family and friends in his
rehabilitation efforts. See State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594-595 (1982) (reducing
sentence of defendant who, inter alia, had the support of his family in his rehabilitation
efforts).

Mr. Wilkins enjoys the support of his family in his rehabilitation efforts.

His

younger brother, Jacob, wrote a thoughtful and detailed letter on his behalf (Smithson
Letter), and testified at sentencing that he would assist Mr. Wilkins while he was on
probation, including providing him with employment, and that he would report any
violations of which he became aware to Mr. Wilkins' probation officer. (Tr., p.272, Ls.525.)

Additionally, several members of Mr. Wilkins' family, including all three of his

children, appeared at sentencing on his behalf.

(Tr., p.273, L.18 - p.274, L.B.)

Mr. Wilkins' daughter Andrea wrote a letter to the district court in which she explained,
"There is [sic] a lot of people willing to help him on his journey to becoming a better man
now that he is truley [sic] ready for change."

(Andrea Wilkins Letter, undated (file-

stamped as received by the district court on August 2, 2010), pp.[1-2].)
Finally, Mr. Wilkins has expressed that he has a drug problem and that he is
willing to participate in any treatment program. At sentencing, he explained,
I'm willing to do any treatment and/or programs you may give me. I have
beaten my addiction, but I will always be an addict. I'm willing to further
my knowledge and tools to help my recovery.
(Tr., p.281, Ls.9-12.)
Based on the foregoing mitigating circumstances, along with the weakness of the
State's case against him discussed in section I, Mr. Wilkins asserts that his unified
sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, for possession of a controlled substance is
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excessive. As such, he respectfully requests that this Court order that he be placed on
probation.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Wilkins respectfully requests that this Court
vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this matter to the district court for entry of
judgments of acquittal on both charges. In the alternative, Mr. Wilkins requests that this
Court vacate the district court's order finding that he was a persistent violator, and
remand this matter for resentencing without a persistent violator enhancement, or
alternatively, that it vacate and remand for a new trial on the persistent violator finding
before a judge who is not a witness. Finally, if Mr. Wilkins is unsuccessful in these other
claims, he respectfully requests that this Court order that he be placed on probation.
DATED this 22 nd day of September, 2011.

SPENCER J. t-rAHN
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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